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HE latest sensation in the popular press and
among policymakers is the discovery of “supply-side
economics” and the exciting promise of supply-side
policies.1 To provide a perspective on the current de-
bate, this article reviews the conceptual basis for sup-
ply-side economics and examines the fundamentals of
supply performance in the United States.
WHAT IS SUPPLY-SiDE ECONOMICS
ALL ABOUT?
Supply-side economics is growth- and efficiency-
oriented. It covers the entire range of economic de-
cisions: what gets produced, how, for whom, and how
fast production and consumption possibilities expand.
The supply-side approach is not novel in economic
analysis. Indeed, it has been the core of economic
analysis since the first systematic analysis of scarcity
and aggregate supply, Adam Smith’s pioneering In-
quiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations, was published over 200 years ago.2
The recent emphasis on supply is novel, however,
in at least one respect — the assertion that supply
1
One of the first major policymaking endorsements of supply-
side economics is contained in Outlook for the 1980’s, Midyear
Report and Staff Study of the Joint Economic Committee of
the Congress (August 1979),
2
For an historical perspective on supply-side economics, see
Robert F. Keleher and William P. Orzechowski, “Supply-Side
Effects of Fiscal Policy: Some Historical Perspectives,” re-
viewed in the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Re-
view (February 1981), pp. 26-28.
effects are of central importance in evaluating gov-
ernment efforts to improve the functioning of the
economy. The conventional view of the functioning of
the economy emphasizes a role for the management
of aggregate demand as an appropriate macroeco-
nomic policy for stabilizing the economy. The normal
tools for influencing aggregate demand are mone-
tary and fiscal policy, including spending for goods
and services, transfer programs and taxation policies.
By influencing demand for output, such policies are
presumed to affect the levels of the nation’s output,
employment and prices, as svell as theft rates of
change. Expanding the growth of the money stock
or government expenditures for goods, services or
transfer programs is viewed as “expansionary” in its
effects on output and employment. Supply-siders
reject such arguments as woefully incomplete. They
emphasize that standard expansionary macroeconomic
policies can significantly reduce the economy’s ability
to produce. In particular, they stress that individual
choices affect the current and future availability of
resources, as well as the efficiency of resource employ-
ment, effects that often are ignored in both macro-
economic analysis and policy decisions.
The supply-side view can be explained using a
simple introductory economics framework. Suppose an
economy has a given quantity of resources such as
labor and capital (plant, equipment, knowledge, etc.)
and an existing array of technologies for producing two
goods called product X and product Y. At any time,
resources can be completely devoted to the production
of one or the other good, or both. If resources are
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used so that the largest production of X is obtained,
for any given output of product Y, the production and
consumption possibilities of the economy can be de-
picted as the curve AB in figure 1. Combinations of
product X andY output beyond AB (such as point C)
are unattainable, given the technology and resources
available, while those inside the curve (such as point
D) are possible, but involve either unemployed re-
sources, the use of inferior technologies, or both.
Given individual preferences and the distribution of
resource ownership among individuals, an economy
with free markets will tend to attain some equilibrium
point (E), where the value of goods reflects the cost
of production and where full employment of existing
resources occurs. Competition among resource owners,
the producers of the two goods and consumers willde-
termine the prices of the products and resources, how
much of each of the goods are produced, which of the
available resources and technologies are used to pro-
duce each good, the incomes of individuals, and the
distribution of goods produced among individuals.
An economy can improve its possibilities for con-
sumption by shifting out its production possibility
frontier (AB in figure 1). This occurs when the
supply of labor or capital resources is increased or
when technology is improved. Thus, individuals make
choices that determine the rate of growth of income
or the supply of goods producible under high-employ-
ment conditions. These choices involve foregoingpres-
A Shift in the Production Possibility Frontier
ent consumption so that resources can be used for
research and development, innovation or the produc-
tion of new capital goods. Figure 2 shows such a
shift in production (and consumption) possibilities.
When the production possibility frontier shifts from
AB to A’B’, individuals choose the opportunity to con-
sume an output mix such as E’.
Supply-side economics focuses on two aspects of
the simple framework above: first, that economic
policy directly affects the rate of growth of resource
supplies and the pattern of innovation, impinging on
the rate at which the economy’s production possibili-
ties improve; second, that economic policy can alter
the position of the current production possibility
frontier.3
Supply-Side Effects of Regulation
Economic policies to regulate business can affect
supply. In a market economy, the government can
promote efficiency by regulating efforts to achieve mo-
nopoly control in resource or product markets. Such
regulatory policies can also promote faster output
growth by policing business practices that limit com-
petition, technological development and innovation.
3A detailed discussion of the supply-side approach to macro-
economic policy may be found io Laurence H. Meyer, ed.,
The Supply-Side Effects of Economic Policy (Center for the
Study of American Business and the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, 1981).
of
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Regulatory policies can adversely affect consump-
tion possibilities, hosvever. Regulatory programs that
mandate the use of inefficient technologies or that
restrict the use of resources in some or all production
processes cause the production possibility frontier to
shift inward (for example, from A’B’ to AB in figure
2). Such regulations can slow the rate of growth by
retarding technological innovation or by reducing
incentives to accumulate resources or improve their
quality.
Supply-Side Effects of Government Spending
The decision to provide more of one good through
government provision involves attracting resources
away from the production of other goods (a move-
ment along the production possibility frontier). Sup-
ply-siders emphasize, however, that the increased
taxes levied to pay for the new goods can reduce the
total resources available, shifting the frontier inward.
Suppose the economy is initially producing and con-
suming at point E’ in figure 2. An attempt by the
government to increase the output of good X, moving
along the frontier A’B’, can lead to fewer available
resources so that (1) the frontier shifts inward to a
new frontier such as AB, and (2) production occurs at
a point like C. The shift occurs because owners of
human resources can forego supplying these resources
in the marketplace, choosing instead to use labor re-
sources at home or in leisure when confronted with
larger taxes on labor income. Similarly, owners of
capital resources can avoid taxes by reducing the use
of existing plant and equipment, lengthening the use-
ful life of assets, and spending the proceeds from
current use of capital services on consumer goods
instead of replacing the plant and equipment or in-
vestingin new assets. In the case of taxation of income
of capital resources, the effects on the production pos-
sibility frontier tend to show up more heavily in the
future through reduced growth of resources, rather
than in immediate inward shifts of the frontier.
Taxation can also give rise to other forms of tax
avoidance that shift the frontier inward. When taxes
on resource incomes are different depending on the
use of the resources, resource owners may continue
supplying resources in the marketplace, but divert
these resources to lower-taxed, less-efficient uses.
While this lowers the total productivity of the re-
sources, the after-tax incomes are larger than they
would havebeen if resources were used in the high-tax
sectors, Such tax avoidance leads to an inward shift of
the frontier, even if the total supplies of resources
remain the same.
Supply-Side Effects of Redistribution
Similarly, an economic policy aimed at changing
the distribution of consumption goods among indi-
viduals can affect supply. A program that taxes in-
come recipients in order to transfer existing output
to particular groups can reduce the total consumption
possibilities of the community. For example, increased
unemployment benefits, food stamps and social secu-
rity benefits involve increased transfers and taxes.
Higher taxes can reduce the supply of resources avail-
able both now and in the future; in addition, higher
transfer payments reduce some individuals’ incentives
to accumulate and supply resources in the market-
place. Both the programs and the higher taxes to sup-
port them can reduce resource supplies.4 Reductions
in resource employment reduce output. Government
policies to transfer more of the goods produced at
point Ei nfigure 1 to a particular group can shift the
overall production and consumption possibilities of
the economy inward, as the higher taxes to pay for
the redistributed goods and the increased availability
of transfer payments reduce the total resources avail-
able for use in production.
Supply-siders emphasize that the critical factor in
government transfer and spending decisions is that
such expenditures are financed either by taxation, bor-
rowing from the public or increasing the money sup-
ply. These methods of finance lead to reductions in the
total supply of resources available for production.
Higher tax rates discourage individuals from work,
saving and productive investment. Financing through
government deficits (borrowing), simply postpones
taxes and “crowds out” private-sector investment in
plant, equipment and consumer durables such as hous-
ing and autos, as financing costs are raised.
Supply-Side Effects of Monetary Policy
Attempts to finance expenditures by printing money
similarly reduce the nation’s production possibilities.
A faster rate of money growth increases the rate of
inflation (the rate at which the value of money de-
clines). Inflation interferes with economic efficiency.
For example, it creates uncertainties about the mean-
ing of price changes. When a product’s price is
raised or when wages in an industry rise, it is
4
These considerations do not imply an aversion to redistribu-
tion schemes on the part ofsnpply-siders. From a strictly posi-
five view, however, supply-siders would tend to emphasize
that the nation’s distributional objectives can be accomplished
more or less efficiently depending on the supply-side incentives
involved.
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less clear whether the increase reflects the scarcity
of the product or resource, or the inflation process.
Inflation also distorts the allocation of resources, as
people employ scarce resources to economize on the
higher cost of holding money. The disproportionate
growth of resource employment in banking, financial
intermediaries and financial management services is
an example of such an inefficiency.
The supply-side effects of inflation also arise through
the U.S. tax system. The principal characteristic of the
tax system that creates supply-side disincentives when
inflation occurs is its basis on historical nominal ac-
counting of income. For the individual income tax,
this has two important implications. First, when infla-
tion is higher, investors require higher rates of return
to compensate for the erosion of purchasing power of
both future interest payments and the original sum
loaned. These higher interest rates simply allow the
maintenance of the purchasing power of investors’
portfolios. The added interest is compensation for a
maintenance expense, not income. Nonetheless, these
higher interest payments are taxed as income. The
higher taxes on these non-income payments reduce
the incentives to save and invest.
Second, the individual income tax is applied against
nominal income in a progressive fashion, As a result,
when wages and other income simply keep pace with
inflation, individuals find themselves in higher and
higher tax brackets, so that the purchasing power
of their income declines. This process, sometimes
called “bracket creep,” subjects individuals to increas-
ingly higher taxes on existing and any prospective ad-
ditions to purchasing power. Consequently, workers
have less incentive to work or save, despite the tend-
ency of wages to keep pace with inflation.
For business, tax accounting again is based on
historical nominal magnitudes. Thus, inventory ex-
penses and depreciation are computed on the basis
of the past dollar expenditures on goods, equipment
or plant, instead of the current dollar costs of replac-
ing the inventory or plant and equipment currently
being used up in production. As a result, inflation
leads to an understatement of the true costs and
therefore an overstatement of business income and
artificially inflated taxes. Since historical cost account-
ing subjects a given real cash flow of a business to
higher taxes, businesses are discouraged from adding
new productive assets during inflationary periods. Of
course, the result of reduced savings and investment
is to slow the pace at which the production possibility
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frontier shifts outward. For a given labor force, the
growth of output per worker slows.
SUPPLY-SIDE POLICY IMPLICATIONS
AND PROPOSALS
An immediate policy concern of supply-siders is to
redress the destructive effects of policies created by
demand management and regulatory strategies over
the post-war era, particularly since the early 1960s.
This redress involves slower monetary expansion, reg-
ulatory reform, tax reduction and tax reform that re-
duce the disincentives to produce, work, save and
invest.
To deal with the disincentives created by inflation,
many supply-siders recommend indexing the tax sys-
tem. For example, replacement cost accounting would
permit firms to deduct from receipts the true cost of
depreciation in computing income, avoiding the dis-
incentives to invest posed by inflation. Second, infla-
tion premia in interest rates could be excluded from
taxation for firms and individuals. Finally, tax brackets
for computing the individual income tax can be tied
to the inflation rate to avoid bracket creep.
To reverse the disincentives created by past policy,
some policymakers influenced by supply-side eco-
nomics have recommended large reductions in tax
rates on additional individual income, specifically a
Kemp-Roth tax rate cut of 10 percent per year for 3
years. To reverse disincentives due to under-depreci-
ation in the past, they have recommended a “10-5-3”
capital cost recovery plan that accelerates the depre-
ciation of physical assets to 10 years for structures, 5
years for business equipment and 3 years for cars and
trucks used by business. Since capital expenditures
under this plan are deducted from receipts as an ex-
pense sooner than otherwise, the additional income
accruing from new capital expenditures is smaller in
the earlier years of the life of an asset and larger
later on. For the same additional receipts over the
useful life of an asset, measured income is unaffected
by accelerated depreciation; less of the income, how-
ever, is measured in the early years, while more is
measured later. Therefore, taxes on income from as-
sets are postponed, providing a greater incentive to
invest today.
These two tax proposals have been the subject of
controversy for several years. The intensity of the de-
bate has increased dramatically since the proposals
became the centerpiece of the initial tax package of
the Reagan administration. It is ironic that the debate
has become so tightly linked to arguments about
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supply-side economics. While both of these proposals
arose out of concern for the disincentive effects of
bracket creep and historical cost depreciation in an
inflationary environment, neither confronts the source
of the disincentive — nominal income taxation. In-
stead, both are aimed at redressing the disincentives
created by past inflation.
The Kemp-Roth plan focuses on the importance of
cutting “marginal tax rates,” the rates applied on ad-
ditional income, instead of simply cutting average tax
rates. This distinction is of critical importance to sup-
ply-siders. The average tax rate is simply the total
tax paid divided by the tax base, the adjusted gross
income in the case of the individual federal income
tax. For the income tax, the tax rate (marginal) on
successive dollars of income is a rising percentage of
additional income. The tax rate applied to additions
to income (marginal rate) exceeds the average tax
paid at any level of income. The marginal tax rate is
the rate that influences decisions to earn more income
by increasing work or savings. A rise in the marginal
rate from 20 percent to 30 percent means that an
additional $100 of income will net only $70 after
taxes instead of $80, so the incentive to forego leisure
or consumption to work or save to earn this $100 is
reduced.
Chart 1 shows measures of the marginal and aver-
age tax rates over the past two decades. The average
tax rate has changed little over the years shown. Pe-
riodic tax reductions have offset the effect of bracket
creep on the average tax bill, The marginal rate, how-
ever, has risen sharply since 1970.
The Kemp-Roth proposal, however, does not legis-
late automatic insulation of marginal rates from the
inflation rate, a fundamental tenet of supply-side
economics. Moreover, the “10-5-3” proposal, a simpli-
fied accelerated depreciation plan, is unrelated to the
continuing disincentives created through the use of
historical cost accounting in an inflationary environ-
ment.5 Neither of these proposals insulate cm-rent or
5There are alternative proposals that reflect concern over these
supply-side issues. For example, the Black Caucus proposes
indexing tax rates on so-called earned income while the Jor-
genson-Auerbaeh plan emhodied in House Resolution 2525
attempts to elisninate the effects of inflation on depreciation
expenses and business tax burdens. On the fonner, See Bureau
of National Affairs, Inc., Daily Report for Exccutivc, DER No.
82, April 29, 1981, p. LL-12; the jorgenson-Auerhach proposal
is discussed in Dale W. Jorgenson and Peter Navarro, “10-5-3:
‘Deeply Flawed’,” and the accompanying editorial “Real De-
preciation, Real Inflation,” New York Times, May 5, 1981.
Note that, unlike the President’s proposals, these two pro-
posals are aimed at avoiding future supply-side effects of in-
flation but not at correcting for past disincentives.
future taxes from the ravages of inflation.6
Perhaps the greatest irony of the debate over these
two proposals is that neither proposal is a path-break-
ing supply-oriented innovation. Many claim that such
policies are unproven and that their effects are un-
known. While this may be the case for some supply-
oriented policies, it is untrue of the Kemp-Roth pro-
posal or “10-5-3.” Experimcnts with these two types
of tax changes were the hallmark of the “New Eco-
nomics” of the sixties. Much was written before and
after such changes about their effectiveness. While
supply-siders differ in the analytical approach to such
tax changes, the evidence is certainly availabIe.~
THE SUPPLY-SIDE RECORD
What has happened to the supply side of the econ-
omy during the last 30 years? A review of the record
should show whether the changes in economic policy
of the past two decades have yielded evidence of the
disorders discussed by supply-siders. At the same
thne, such a review can indicate whether the removal
of the disincentives accumulated in the past could
radically affect the economy. There is no question that
the growth of supply of the nation’s output has slowed
markedly, at least since 1973, in large part due to the
stagnant growth of productivity. This stagnation is
supply-related, in that it arises from the astronomical
rise in the price of energy resources relative to the
price of business output and consequent losses in
economic capacity (an inward shift of the production
6The spirit of the tax proposals in correcting for past inflation
effects rather than breaking the link between inflation and tax
rates can be seen in Paul Craig Roberts, “For Supply-Siders,
The Focus is Incentives,” Washington Post, April 13, 1981,
where it is emphasized that the administration plan
doesn’t turn the tax clock back to 1965, but it is a big step
in the right direction.” Roberts notes that the marginal rate
faced by the median-income family of four was at most 17
percent in 1965 and a family with twice the median income
faced, at most, a2 2percent rate. These figures will rise to 32
percent and 49 percent, respectively, in 1984, without the
President’s proposal, according to Roberts. These figures,
Roberts notes, ignore social security and state taxes and their
increase since 1965.
~Unfortunately the existence of such evidence does not mean
that it has been intensely scrutinized or, if it has been, that
there is a consensus among policy analysts about the effective-
ness of past policies. In the case of accelerated depreciation,
business tax cuts, or investment tax credits, debate usually
centers more on the relative merits of the three. See, for ex-
ample, Richard W. Kopeke, “The Efficiency of Traditional
Investment i’ax Incentives,” Public Policy and Capital Forma-
tion, (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
April 1981), pp. 163-75. There is little question that these
three policies tensporarily increase the pace of investment.
Whether such tax cuts temporarily reduce the inflation rate as
supply-side arguments imply, leave it unaffected, or raise it,
as Keynesians might expect, has been largely neglected.
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Personal Tax Rates in the United States
Percent Percetit
40 40
1960 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 1978
- Source: Steven Braun,”Discussion of the Evans Paper,”The Supply-Side Effects of Economic Policy (Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis and Center for the Study of American Business, 19B1(. p.
9
5. The marginal













possibility frontier). This analysis has been detailed
elsewhere, along with an examination of the potential
contributions of traditional sources of productivity
growth to this stagnation.8 The emphasis here is on
the past macroeconomic policy effects on supply.
Chart 2 shows the civilian labor force and the stock
of nonresidential private structures and equipment
tSee John A. Tatomn, “The Productivity Problem,” this Review
(September 1979), pp. 3-16, and the references cited therein.
available since 1947.° The civilian labor force has
grown more rapidly since the mid-sixties. From 1948
to 1965, the labor force expanded at a 1.2 percent
annual rate. From 1965 to 1980, it accelerated to a 2.3
percent rate. Capital stock growth shows about the
same acceleration up until 1973. From 1948 to 1965,
0The stock of plant and equipment is the constant dollar net
stock of fixed non-residential private capital, see John C.
Musgrave, “Fixed Capital Stock in the United States: Revised
Estimates,” Survey of Current Business (Febmary 1981),
pp. 57-68.

























the stock of plant and equipment rose at a U percent
rate. Such growth accelerated to a 4.9 percent rate
from 1965 to 1975, then dropped to a 3.0 percent rate
from 1975 to 1980.
Thus, when one looks at growth rates of available
resources, there appears to be no major deterioration
in the economy’s aggregate supply until after 1975. In-
deed, from 1965 to 1975, supplies of resources were
expanding much faster than before. The factors cited
by supply-siders that reduce resource availability
(such as the increasing regulation of both technology
and the pattern of resource employment, inflation, ris-
ing marginal tax rates on income, and a growing share
of government spending and transfer payments) do
not seem to have seriously impaired resource avail-
ability, at least not before 1975.
Although this analysis is crude, a more detailed
analysis shows essentially the same patterns. In par-
ticular, labor force growth is a crude measure of labor
resource availability because it is heavily influenced
by population trends rather than short-term economic
factors. Supply-side policies can change the willing-
ness of a given population of labor-force age to work
by increasing their participation in the labor force or
by increasing the effort of the labor force. Chart 3
shows the percentage of the population over age 16
in the labor force. There has been no apparent deteri-
oration in overall participation in the labor force.’°
Supply-side policies could also affect labor resource
~~In a detailed study of the labor force participation rate,
Leonall C. Andersen, “An Explanation of Movements in the
Labor Force Participation Rate: 1957-76,” this Review (Au-
gust 1978), pp. 7-21, found that an individual income tax
rate cut would have a small transitory effect of increasing
the participation rate. He also observed that social security
tax cuts would have small permanent effects, lowering par-
ticipation, and that reduced social seemsrity benefits would
have pemsanent effects raising participation.
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Chart 2
Supply of Capital and Labor in the United States
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availability by altering the supply of work effort of a
given labor force, for example, by changing the aver-
age hours worked per worker. Average hours worked
have shown a significant downward trend throughout
the post-World War II period, but this trend has not
significantly accelerated in recent years. Nonetheless,
studies of labor supply indicate that higher marginal
tax rates have small negative effects on working hours,
especially for wives with children.1’
11
See Jerry A. flausman, “Labor Supply,” in Henry J. Aaron
and A. Joseph Pechman, eds., How Taxes Affect Economic
Behavior (Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 27-83. Detailed
statistical analysis is required to support these results because
the effect is relatively small, given the increases in marginal
rates that have occurred in the post-war period. For reduc-
tions in marginal rates to 1965 levels, the tax effect on labor
resource availability would be correspondingly small and
difficult to observe by simple statistical analysis. In addition,
unless the reductions were repeated in subsequent years, the
modest increase in hours would be of a once-and-for-all
variety.
Finally, the available supply of labor need not have
kept pace with the expansion of the labor force if
the unemployment rate associated with full employ-
ment has risen significantly. While most analysts agree
that the unemployment rate associated with high
employment conditions has risen over the last 25
years, even the largest estimates of this increase would
not reverse the pattern of accelerated labor resource
growth shown in chart 2. More important, there is
scant evidence that the rise in such a “full-employ-
ment” unemployment rate has been associated with
growing supply-side disincentives.’2 Some policies
presumably lead to a withdrawal from the labor force
tm2
See, for example, Daniel Hamermesh, “Transfers, Taxes, and
the NAIRU,” in The Supply Side Effects of Economic Policy.
The NAIRU is the non-accelerating inflation rate of unem-
ployment and is comparable to (usually used as synonomous




Source: U.S. Department of Labor
25of workers with relatively high unemployment rates
while others lead to withdrawal of individuals with
relatively low unemployment rates. An example of
the former is the rising minimum wage that reduces
opportunities for the young, resultingin their dropping
out of the labor force, An example of the latter is the
effect of an increasingly generous social security sys-
tem that induces older workers who normally have a
more favorable employment record to quit earlier.
Changes in the composition of the labor force due to
demographic changes have been the primary source
of the increase in the full-employment unemployment
rate.
Another factor often accused of creating supply-side
problems is the rapid growth of government activity.
The expansion of the role of government in the econ-





where productivity growth tends to be greater. Thus,
the rate at which the production and consumption
possibility curve shifts could be lowered. This view,
however, misstates the pattern of government growth
in the economy in recent years. Chart 4 shows the
share of federal government purchases of goods and
services in total output (GNP) and the share of fed-
eral employment in civilian employment. Both of these
measures peaked some years ago.1’ It is difficult to
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1mmThe same pattern holds for state and local governments. The
share of state and local govemment purchases of goods and
services in GNP rose steadily until 1971 when it reached the
13 percent level. In 1973-75, the share surged upward to
over 14 percent and has subsequently declined to below
13 percent. Employees on state and local government pay-
rolls as a percent of the civilian labor force also climbed
steadily throughout the post-war period, peaking at about
13 percent in 1975, then declining slightly.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MAY 1981
Chart 5
Federal Government Expenditures
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show that government has constrained output growth
by altering the allocation of resources away from the
private sector.’4
How, then, has growth in the size of government
adversely affected the supply side of the economy?
‘
4
Other forms of capital fonnation, including government, Sl,Ow
the same slowing as that in the husiness sector. From 1960
to 1973, the growth of the federal government capital stock
was at a 1.1 percent rate; from 1973 to 1980, this growth rate
declined to a 0.4 percent rate. For state and local govern-
ments, the decline was from a 4.8 percent to a 2.0 percent
rate froma 1973 to 1980. The growth of the residential housing
stock declined from a 4.0 percent rate from 1948 to 1965, to a
2.7 percent rate from 1973 to 1980. Thus while inflation and
the tax system combined to reduce capital formation in busi-
ness and divert some capital formation toward the housing
sector, there was a slowing there. Even in owner-occupied
housing, the sector with the greatest relative attractiveness,
the growth rate of the housing stock declined from a 5.0 per-
cent rate from 1948 to 1965 to a 3.2 percent rate from 1973
to 1980. See Musgrave, “Fixed Capital Stock” for data on
these sectors.
Chart 5 shows the growth of federal government
expenditures (purchases of goods and services plus
transfer payments) and transfer payments alone, with
both measured as a share of GNP. The share of ex-
penditures has grown due to the extremely rapid
growth of transfer payments. The growth in transfer
payments is the only likely candidate as a major
source of government disincentives for production
and growth.
Moreover, it is this type of fiscal development over
which there is the greatest difference between demand
and supply analysts. Demand analysts presume that
tax increases to pay for increased transfer payments
simply redistribute purchasing power with no real
effects on demand, prices or aggregate output. From
a supply analyst’s view, such a policy produces a
“double wharmny,” as both increased transfers and
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Productivity the market. But it must be emphasized that the
trends in growth of resources do not indicate that
the growing share of transfer payments has severely
affected aggregate resource supplies.
THE OUTLOOK FOB
SUPPLY-SIDE EFFECTS
While the past record does not indicate the possi-
bility of revolutionary developments on the supply
side of the economy, supply-oriented policies could
modestly affect resource availability, economic effi-
ciency and growth, As noted earlier, for example,
higher marginal tax rates have negative effects on
work effort. Thus, reductions in marginal rates should
increase labor resource availability. In addition, sup-
ply-side policies can have modest temporary effects
on investment and productivity growth.
Investment
The growth of the capital stock accelerated mildly
(chart 2) following a move toward accelerated de-
preciation and the introduction of the investment tax
credit in 1962, and the cut in individual and business
marginal tax rates in 1964-65. Similar actions in late
1971 also appear to have led to a mild subsequent
acceleration. When the investment tax credit was sus-
pended from October 1966 to March 1967 and again
from April 1969 to December 1971, real producer
durable investment slowed. From the third quarter
of 1966 to the first quarter of 1967, real investment
in equipment declined at a 3.0 percent rate, sub-
stantially slower than the 14.1 percent rate of expan-
sion over the prior year or the 16.7 percent rate of
the prior two years. From the first quarter of 1969
to the fourth quarter of 1971, such investment slowed
to a 3.7 percent rate of growth. Over the prior year,
such investment had risen at a 10.1 percent rate;
it rose at a 9.6 percent rate for the two years ending
in the first quarter of 1969. In the year following the
end of each of these two suspensions, real investment
in producer durables accelerated — to a 9.1 percent
rate of growth in the first case, and to a 17.9 percent
rate of growth in the second. From the end of 1962
to 1974, the constant dollar net stock of private non-
residential fixed capital rose at a 4.8 percent rate,
much faster than the 3.5 percent rate of the prior
decade, or the 3.0 percent rate from end of 1974 to
the end of 1980.
Accelerations in capital formation affect productiv-
ity growth. Nonetheless, improvements in the quantity
and quality of plant and equipment do not yield
massive changes in aggregate productivity. Most esti-
mates of the impact of faster growth of plant and
equipment show that a 1 percent increase in the
growth rate of the capital stock adds no more than
0.3 percent to the growth rate of productivity. Thus,
a3percentage-point increase in the pace of capital
formation, extremely large by historical standards,
would likely add less than 1 percent to the rate of
advance of output per worker, or output per hour.
Also, most programs to cut the cost of plant and
equipment for firms or to increase returns from invest-
ing in new capital only temporarily affect capital for-
mation. Essentially, such policies raise the optimal
amount of plant and equipment available per worker.
According to economic theory, investment will accel-
erate to reach the optimal proportions, but is subse-
quently unaffected. This is important because itindi-
cates that any added productivity growth from
supply-oriented policies is temporary.
Inflation
The greatest controversy concerning recent supply-
oriented proposals concerns the effect on inflation.
Some advocates of supply-side economics contend
that supply-oriented policies will contribute to the
elimination of inflation.’5 The source of confusion in
this analysis is a standard mark-up view of inflation
that equates the inflation rate (~)to the rate of in-
crease in wage rates (W), less the rate of produc-
tivity growth (*). In this view, if productivity growth
accelerates, then the rate of inflation slows (given
the rate of increase in wages, W). Even were this
view correct, supply-oriented policies would provide
little assistance for the anti-inflation effort. For the
massive acceleration in capital formation and produc-
tivity growth in the example above, the pace of price
increases would slow by less than 1 percentage point;
even this gain would be as temporary as the accelera-
tion in productivity growth.
But this mark-np view of inflation really has little
to say about inflation. Instead, the equation tells
something about the wedge between inflation of prod-
15
See, for example, the analysis in the Joint Economic Com-
mittee, Outlook for the 1980’s, pp. 11-14.
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uct prices and the rate of increase in resource prices,
especially prices of labor; that is, the rate of increase
in the purchasing power of wages, (* — E), equals
the rate of increase in productivity, (X). Conse-
quently, faster productivity growth will increase the
pace of growth of the purchasing power of wages,
with little or no effect on the pace of wage and price
inflation, per se. Since inflation is solely a monetary
phenomenon, the only workable solution is to slow the
growth in the supply of money.
At the other extreme, some supply-side critics argue
that tax cuts, like those in the administration proposals,
will lead to an increase in inflation.16 This conclusion
is based on the argument that tax cuts increase de-
mand for the nation’s output, since only part of the
proceeds of a tax cut is saved, while the rest is spent.
Two corollaries of this view are that a tax cut raises
the deficit and that it causes higher interest rates.
Given the nation’s income or tax base, it is easy to
see that the deficit increases, Also, the government
must replace the funds involved in a tax cut by bor-
rowing (assuming government expenditures remain
the same), but only part of the cut is available for
lending, that is, the portion saved. Consequently, in-
terest rates will tend to rise to attract the additional
lending required and to bid funds away from private
sector borrowers.
The conceptual shortcomings of this view are
equally well known. The burden of government ex-
penditures on household budgets is not measured by
current taxes, but rather by the expenditures them-
selves. If current taxes are insufficient to pay for cur-
rent expenditures, then either future taxes must be
raised to pay the interest costs on a larger debt, or
the debt can remain the same, if the Federal Reserve
finances the additional portion by expanding the
money supply faster. In tbe latter case, households pay
the remainder of current taxes through higher inflation
rates. Since the wealth and income of the economy is
unaffected by a tax cut, it cannot lead to higher spend-
ing. A second problem is that even if individuals in-
correctly perceive their wealth as larger after a tax
cut and attempt to spend more on goods and services,
a tax cut would indeed imply a shortage of funds in
financial markets to finance the larger deficit. Interest
rates would haveto rise by enough to reduce spending
to its original level.
For example, if taxes were cut $50 billion and
neither government expenditures nor the Federal
T6
An example of this argument is found in “Ease Off Kemp-
Roth,’ The New York Times, May 15, 1981.
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Reserve’s holding of government debt were changed,
the government would have to borrow an additional
$50 billion. Now if individuals initially planned to
spend $40 billion while saving only $10 billion of the
tax cut, the excess borrowing requirement would be
the amount of increased private spending, $40 billion.
As the government attempts to raise the additional
$40 billion in credit markets, interest rates would rise
to increase household savings or reduce the borrowing
and spending of other borrowers. Whether the $40
billion is attracted through more saving (less con-
sumer spending) or less business borrowing (less in-
vestment spending), total spending will tend to be
unaffected by the tax cut. In summary, a tax cut may
cause interest rates to rise, but is unlikely to affect
total spending demands and, therefore, inflation.
The difficulties encountered by the higher deficits/
interest rates/inflation argument are not simply logical
shortcomings. First, the tax cuts envisioned by the
administration are accompanied by spending reduc-
tions, so there will tend to be little effect on the deficit
or on interest rates. Second, the Kemp-Roth “cuts” in
taxes are likely only to offset bracket creep over the
next three years; thus, they are not really cuts in
current taxes at all, simply offsets to keep average and
marginal rates from rising due to current and prospec-
tive inflationJ~Finally, the experience surrounding
the 1964 Kennedy tax cut and the 1975 tax cut would
not support the higher deficits/interest rates/inflation
scenario even if the administration were proposing a
cut in taxes. In the 1964 case, the deficit rose very
slightly and briefly, but interest rates did not rise
until well after the tax cut.’8 Inflation did begin to
worsen, but only in response to the acceleration in
money growth that began in 1963.
In 1975, federal taxes were reduced by increasing
exemptions and the standard deduction, In that in-
stance, the deficit rose sharply but interest rates did
liThis argument has been mnade by, among others, Martin
Feldstein, “‘No Real Tax Cut’ in Adnministration Plan,” New
York Journal of Commerce, May 21, 1981. This point has
also been made recently by Walter H. tidIer, “Supply-Side
Follies of 1981,” Wall Street Journal, June 12, 1981. Heller
uses this point as part of an argument against the Kemp-Roth
cuts. The cuts would keep marginal rates from rising further,
however, so they would avoid a further deterioration in in-
centives over the next few years. This argument merely indi-
cates that Kemp-Roth type cuts will have to be Touch larger
to eliminate the impact of past inflation on marginal tax rates
and incentives, not that such cuts are ineffective.
t8
Nnmerous studies have shown that the 1964 tax cut had no
effect on total spending. Also, a recent discussion by Paul
Evans, “Kemp-Roth and Saving,” Federal Reserve Bank of
Son Francisco %Veekly Letter, May 8, 1981, shows that mnore
than 100 percent of the tax cut was saved, that is, that
consumption actually declined relative to disposable ineomne,
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not. The 1975 tax cut was not associated \vith a more
expansionary monetary policy. Instead, the growth
rate of money stock for the year ending in the fourth
quarter of 1974 was 4.7 percent; for 1975 it was
4.9 percent. These rates followed the rapid pace of
monetary expansion at a 6.1 percent rate during the
previous five years (ending in IV/1974). Consequently,
inflation (GNP deflator) slowed, declining from a 7.7
percent rate in the year ending in the fourth quarter
of 1974 to 4.7 percent in the year ending in the fourth
quarter of 1975. Thus, even when a tax cut does not
lower marginal rates, and/or the deficit increases as
in 1975, it is not the case that interest rates must rise
or that inflation must accelerate.’9
CONCLUSION
Traditional macroeconomic policies affect the allo-
cation, efficiency and growth rate of the supply of
resources in an economy. These effects have been
central to discussions of stabilization policies for
centuries, but with few exceptions have been ignored
in the post-war era. The reemphasis of these effects is
what “supply-side economics” is all about.
There is little evidence to support the notion that
supply-oriented policies will work miracles in restor-
ing productivity growth or in reducing inflation.
Indeed, it is difficult historically to see any major
disruptions of aggregate resource supply or allocation
that are sufficiently profound to explain the stagfla-
tionary performance of the U.S. economy since the
early ‘70s. Only in the area of recent capital forma-
tion is there a clear resource supply shortfall and this
is fully explained by supply forces other than govern-
ment policy (energy price increases)~2o
190n the tenuous link between budget deficits and inflation, see
Scott E. Hem, “Deficits and Inflation,” this Review, (March
1981), pp. 3-10.
T0
The principal determinants of stagflationary developments
since 1973 and 1979-80 have been sharp increases in the
relative price of energy — supply shocks. These increases
fully account for the post-1973 decline in the pace of
At the same time, however, the historical record
clearly indicates that supply-oriented policies can
modestly affect resource availability, especially capital
formation. Also, economic theory indicates a number
of disincentives created by the tax system in an infla-
tionary environment, While the magnitude of these
disincentive effects is difficult to establish empirically,
few economists or policymakers disagree with the im-
portance of remedying these defects in macroeconomic
policy.
The administration’s economic policy proposalshave
incited a great popular debate over supply-side eco-
nomics. Ironically, the proposals are quite modest in
their supply-side orientation. The initial proposals
address the disincentive effects of past policy and are
not aimed at breaking the link between inflation and
the supply of resources and output. Moreover, the
proposed individual income tax cuts are sufficiently
small, so as to maintain marginal tax rates at current
levels, rather than lower them.
No doubt, the issues raised by supply analysts will
be of central importance for some time to come as
policymakers face the continuing challenges to break
the inflation-supply linkage, as well as to stay ahead
of the deterioration in incentives to work, save and
invest due to the cumulative effects of past fiscal,
regulatory and monetary policy. It is likely that, when
the smoke clears, it will be impossible to say that one
can disregard the supply effects of policy any longer.
But then the exaggerated claims or hopes of some
supply analysts will be forgotten as well. Over a
decade ago, Milton Friedman noted that, “In one
sense, we are all Keynesians now; in another, no one
is a Keynesian any longer.” It is likely that a simi-
lar characterization will soon be an apt description
of supply-side economics.
capital formation as well. For a more detailed discussion,
see John A. Tatom, “Energy Prices and Capital Formation:
1972-77,” this Reciew (May 1979), pp. 2-11, and Tatom,
“The Productivity Problem,”
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